"After a review of these authorities, we conclude that National did not subject itself to specific jurisdiction in California merely by accepting premium payments from California and by processing and paying claims submitted by its insureds for services rendered in this state. National did not 'come here' voluntarily, no matter how many insureds did. It was the unilateral decision of Elkman and other insureds to relocate to California which caused National to accept payments from this state and to process and pay claims for services rendered in this state. These circumstances do not support a findin National purposefully availed itself of forum benefits so as to make it subject to specific jurisdiction in California.
Justice H. Walter Croskey
Elkman v. National States Insurance Company (B205919, May 14, 2009)
pp. 20-21
Week of May 11, 2009
Week of May 4, 2009
"Thus the court went beyond the record when it cast the boats as floating apartments or condominiums, and appellant's lease of his slip as analogous to a lease for a dwelling. Respondent contends appellant waived the absence of such evidence on appeal, but respondent cites no authority showing a party opposing summary judgment or adjudication waives the moving party's failure to present evidence to support judgment for the moving party.
Justice Laurence D. Rubin
Nicholls v. Holiday Panay Marina (B202356, May 5, 2009)
p. 10
Week of April 27, 2009
Defendant appeals the judgment, claiming the court erred in spectacular fashion by allowing the wrong plaintiff (standing is contested, as plaintiff is an alleged assignee of the patent owner)to sue the wrong defendant (defendant is the ultimate parent corporation of a French entity that manufactured the licensed products at issue) in the wrong court (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law).
Justice Raymond J. Ikola
Applera Corporation v. MP Biomedicals, LLC (G038984, April 30, 2009)
p. 2
Week of April 20, 2009
"Defendants' argument is curious for another reason. If the rule summarized in Gogri and Franklin applies (which it does not), then Fries's dismissal was invalid because her right to dismiss was foreclosed by the tentative ruling. In that case, subsequent discovery orders are not void - but the basis for defendants' costs awards also disappears. This would seem to be a poor bargain, and, in fact, it is not what defendants appear to be seeking. Instead, it seems defendants would like this court to find the dismissal sufficiently valid to support their costs awards, but not so valid as to deprive the court of jurisdiction to rule on the discovery motions. Not surprisingly, they cite no law for this 'a little bit dismissed' theory."
Justice Peter J. Siggins
Fries v. Rite Aid Corporation (A120488, April 22, 2009
p. 12
Week of April 13, 2009
"As a result of these weighings, modern law, if not replete with examples of 'wrongs' for which there is no remedy, at least offers numerous examples. Thus, although a spouse may sue for loss of consortium deriving from the injury to his or her spouse, an unmarried cohabitant may not. (Cf. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 404-405; Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 277-279.) Although it is easily forseeable that a child may suffer grievous harm when a parent is personally badly injured - similar to a spouse's loss of consortium - no recovery is allowed to a child for damages based on the immediate injury to a parent. (Borere v. American Airlines, Inc. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441, 444; Zwicker v. Altamont Emergency Room Physicians Medical Group (2002) 98 Cal.App. 4th 26, 32.) And, while that same child may recover for personal distress if he or she witnesses the injury to the parent, a sibling who is not present at the moment of injury cannot. (See Dillon, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728, and subsequent cases.
Justice Betty Ann Richli
The Mega Life and Health Insurance Company v. Superior Court of Riverside County (E045969, April 14, 2009)
p. 6
Week of August 18, 2008
"As we have noted, Pelton-Shepherd did not file a motion for leave to reopen discovery so that its motion to compel could be heard after the discovery motion cutoff date. It is disingenuous for Pelton-Shepherd to suggest the trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting a motion Pelton-Shepherd never made."
Justice Ronald B. Robie
Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (C055449, Aug. 19, 2008)
p. 33
Week of August 11, 2008
"The arbitration clause in issue was part of an agreement between two business entities governing their business relationship. While the language of the arbitration provision might be broadly construed to cover every type of business dispute that might arise between the two signators, it cannot seriously be argued that the parties intended it to cover tort claims arising from an alleged violent physical assault by an employee of one company against an employee of the other in the context of an intimate domestic relationship between the them."
Justice Sandra L. Margulies
RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West (August 15, 2008, A118077)
p. 13
