"The City nevertheless argues that the property was not in a dangerous condition because vehicles rarely hit hydrants at the terminal. This argument ignores the evidence that prior to the reconfiguration of the terminal, no hydrants were situated in the path of traffic. Rather, they were located in container storage areas out of the path of traffic. Thus, the absence of a large number of prior accidents involving fire hydrants would not be a material factor in determining whether the location of the hydrant was a dangerous condition. The City also points out that no other vehicles collided with this particular hydrant before or after Young’s accident. We find no significance to this fact. The hydrant was exposed to traffic for only 30 hours before Young’s accident and for two months after the accident. Following the accident, SSA requested that flashing barricades be installed in front of the hydrant until it could be relocated. It is not clear from the record whether such barricades were actually installed, but if so, such an obvious warning would undoubtedly have a bearing on the number of accidents."
Justice Kathryn Doi Todd
City of Long Beach v. Stevedoring Services of America (Dec. 4, 2007, B187003)
p.12
Week of December 3, 2007
Week of November 26, 2007
"ACSC knew its older managers objected to its compensation reduction plan. Jurors could reasonably infer it used pretexts to deny Wysinger a transfer and created a hostile work environment in retaliation for his EEOC complaint. Kane told Wysinger, "[W]e are going to crush" the managers opposed to the plan. He told Coleman, "It doesn't matter what you did for this company in the last 30 . . . years. None of that matters. And you can die at your desk. We'll replace you tomorrow. Nobody cares." The jury could find that this callous and retaliatory conduct merits an award of punitive damages"
Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert
Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (Nov. 29, 2007, B191028)
P. 14
ABA Journal Blawg 100
I was surprised and pleased to learn that this blawg had been selected for the ABA Journal Blawg 100. The complete list is on the ABA Journal site, where you can vote for your favorite blawgs in twelve categories. If you'd like to vote for this blawg (and I'd be delighted if you did) you can do it here.
Week of November 19, 2007
"It has apparently become common practice in the trial courts for litigants to file a “notice of unavailability” under the guise of Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. v. Sparks (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 299. The notice purports to advise the other parties to the action—as well as the court—that the deliverer will not be available for a prescribed period of time and that no action may be taken during that period which adversely affects the unavailable party. To the extent this practice attempts to put control of the court’s calendar in the hands of counsel—as opposed to the judiciary—it is an impermissible infringement of the court’s inherent powers."
The Court
Carl v. Superior Court (Nov. 21, 2007, G038766)
p. 2
Week of November 12, 2007
"Next, plaintiffs contend LA Sound is not liable for the misrepresentations on the application. They claim LA Sound did not know about the joint venture. They further claim the insurance broker was St. Paul's agent and solely responsible for the application's accuracy. But LA Sound was a party to the joint venture agreement. And an insurance broker by definition represents policyholders, not insurers."
Justice Raymond J. Ikola
LA Sound USA, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (Nov. 14, 2007, G036691)
p.8
Week of November 5, 2007
"We agree with our colleagues in Division Five that Insurance Code section 1871.7* was not designed to prohibit fraud on the part of insurers, but rather to prohibit submission of fraudulent claims to insurers, and thus we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
This is appellant's third attempt to assert a claim under section 1871.7 based upon an insurance company's claims handling practices."
Justice Madeleine Flier
State of California ex rel. John Metz v. Farmers Group, Inc. (Nov. 9, 2007, B196455)
p. 2
*Footnote omitted
Week of October 29, 2007
"Although Northrop does not expressly say so, it appears to be arguing that, even if the 10-year statute applies to enforcement actions, the four-year statute applies to recognition actions. For this there is no authority, not even Dore v. Thornburgh, which was an action to enforce a foreign judgment and predated the Uniform Act’s recognition provisions by 75 years. Moreover, the suggestion that a shorter statute of limitations should apply to a “recognition” action than to an action seeking enforcement of the judgment after it is recognized is irrational, as it would completely undercut the Legislature’s intent to enforce foreign judgments in like manner with sister state judgments.
Justice Laurence D. Rubin
Guimaraes v. Northrop Grumman Corporation (Oct. 30, 2007, B194205)
p. 8
Bonus Quote: From page 9 of the same case: "Northrop further argues that the Legislature’s requirement that foreign judgments be enforced “in the same manner” as sister state judgments does not include time limitations, which govern “when” an action may be brought, not “how” it must be brought. Neither legal authorities nor common sense supports this proposition. The definition of “manner” includes “a mode of procedure” (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1989) p. 724, column 2), and timing is a matter of procedure."
